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In Roe v. Wade,' the United States Supreme Court held that a
pregnant woman has a fundamental privacy right, derived from the
liberty language of section one of the Fourteenth Amendment,2 to
obtain an abortion. That right, however, must be balanced against the
State's interests in the health of the pregnant woman and the
"potential life" of her unborn child, which interests become
compelling at different stages of pregnancy.' The State's interest in
the health of the woman does not become "compelling," and,
therefore, strong enough to support regulation of the abortion
procedure, until the end of the first trimester of pregnancy, at which
point the risks associated with undergoing an abortion are
approximately equal to the risks associated with carrying the child to
term.' And the State's interest in the "potential life" of the unborn
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history of abortion regulation, assisted suicide, criminal law, sex discrimination, and state equal
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1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law. .
3. Roe,410U.S.at152-56.
4. Id. at 148-50, 153-56, 159, 162-64.
5. Id. at 163.
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child does not become "compelling," and strong enough to support a
prohibition of abortion, until the child is viable (i.e., capable of
sustained survival outside the mother with or without medical
assistance).6 Even after the child's viability, however, the States may
not prohibit an abortion if the procedure is necessary to preserve the
pregnant woman's life or health.7 In the companion case of Doe v.
Bolton,8 the Court held that the medical judgment as to whether an
abortion is necessary "may be exercised in light of all factors-
physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman's age-
relevant to the well being of the patient. All these factors may relate
to health."9 The Court, however, has not yet reviewed a post-viability
abortion ban, and it remains unclear whether the expansive definition
of "health" in Doe v. Bolton represents a limitation on the States'
authority to prohibit post-viability abortions.10
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey," a plurality of the Court
abandoned the "trimester scheme" set forth in Roe v. Wade, tacitly
downgraded the nature of the right recognized in Roe, and adopted a
new standard for evaluating abortion regulations.12 A regulation of
abortion is constitutional unless it imposes an "undue burden" on the
woman's choice to obtain an abortion.13 An "undue burden" exists if
the regulation in question "has the purpose or effect of placing a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a
nonviable fetus."' 4 In Casey, the Court reaffirmed the "viability" rule
in Roe that "[r]egardless of whether exceptions are made for
particular circumstances, a State may not prohibit any woman from
making the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy before
viability."' 5 The upshot of Casey is that the States have broader
authority to regulate abortion throughout pregnancy but no authority
6. Id. at 163-64. The Court stated that a "fetus becomes 'viable,"' when it is "potentially
able to live outside the mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid." Id. at 160.
7. Id.
8. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
9. Id at 192.
10. In his dissent from the denial of certiorari in Voinovich v. Women 's Med. Prof'I Corp.,
523 U.S. 1036 (1998), Justice Thomas, joined by the late Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia, expressed the view that nothing in Doe v. Bolton, properly considered, limits the authority
of the States to prohibit post-viability abortions. Voinovich, 523 U.S. at 1039-40 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting from the denial of certiorari).
11. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
12. Id at 869-79.
13. Id. at 873-79.
14. Id at 877.
15. Id. at 879.
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to prohibit abortion before viability (and their authority to prohibit
abortion after viability remains unclear).
Roe and Casey, of course, were limited to laws prohibiting
and regulating abortion. Although, in Roe, the Court held that the
unborn child is not a "person" within the meaning of section one of
the Fourteenth Amendment, 16 neither Roe nor Casey purported to
address the States' authority to define the legal status of the unborn
child outside the context of abortion or to confer legal rights upon the
unborn child that do not interfere with the exercise of the "abortion
liberty" recognized in Roe. Indeed, the Court has held that, apart from
the regulation of abortion, nothing in Roe precludes the States from
extending the protection of the law to unborn children.17 This article
explores the multi-faceted ways in which state law protects unborn
children outside the context of abortion-in criminal law, tort law,
health care law, property law and guardianship law.
I. CRIMINAL LAW
FETAL HOMICIDE STATUTES
More than two-thirds of the States have enacted statutes that
define the killing of an unborn child (outside the scope of abortion) as
a form of homicide. Some States have included gestational
requirements, such as viability,' 8 "quickening," 1 9 or some other stage
16. Roe, 410 U.S. at 156-59. Section one provides, in relevant part, "nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
17. See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 506 (1989) (noting that "State law
has offered protections to unborn children in tort and probate law" without running afoul of Roe).
18. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.09 (West 2007) (homicide) (defining "unborn quick child" in
terms of viability); id. § 782.071 (vehicular homicide); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-1(4) (West
2004 & Supp. 2011) (murder); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-3(a)(2) (West 2004 & Supp. 2011)
(voluntary manslaughter); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-4(b), (d) (West 2004 & Supp. 2011)
(involuntary manslaughter); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-103 (West Supp. 2011); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.322 (West 2004) (a "quickening" manslaughter statute which,
subsequent to Roe, the Michigan Supreme Court limited to post-viability criminal acts, Larkin v.
Cahalan, 208 N.W.2d 176 (Mich. 1973)); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-5 (2002) (defining
"quickening" in terms of viability); see also Michigan and Indiana statutes cited infra note 21.
Viability is that stage of pregnancy, normally between the twenty-third and twenty-fourth week,
when the child is capable of sustained survival outside of the mother, with or without medical
assistance.
19. NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 200.2 10 (LexisNexis 2006) (manslaughter); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 9A.32.060(l)(b) (West Supp. 2012) (manslaughter); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.04(2)(a)
(West 2005) (intentional destruction of the life of a "quick unborn child"); see also Wisconsin
statutes cited infra note 21. "Quickening" is that stage of pregnancy, usually between the sixteenth
and eighteenth week, when the woman first detects fetal movement.
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of pregnancy.20 But the most common approach, the one that has
been adopted in more than one-half of the States, has been to make
the killing of an unborn child a crime without regard to any arbitrary
gestational age.21 Although fetal homicide statutes have been
20. Arkansas draws the line at twelve weeks gestation. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-
102(13)(B)(i)(a), (b) (West Supp. 2011) (cross-referencing homicide offenses); id. §§ 5-10-101 to
-105. Under California law, the offense of murder has been defined to include the unlawful killing
of a "fetus," see CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 2008), which the California Supreme Court
has interpreted to mean "post-embryonic" (i.e., seven to eight weeks gestation). People v. Davis,
872 P.2d 591, 599 (Cal. 1994). Virginia also has enacted a statute prohibiting the "[k]illing of a
fetus," VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-32.2 (West 2009), but the term "fetus" is not defined in the
criminal code and has not yet been interpreted by the state supreme court.
21. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-l(a)(3) (Supp. 2011); ALASKA STAT. § l.81.900(b)(62) (2010)
(definition of unborn child); ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.150 to -170 (2010) (substantive offenses);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1102(A), (B) (2010) (negligent homicide); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
13-l103(A)(5), (B) (2010) (manslaughter); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1104(A), (B) (2010)
(second degree murder); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-I 105(A)(1), (C) (2010) (first degree
murder); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-80 (West 2007 & Supp. 2010) (feticide); GA. CODE ANN. § 40-
6-392.1 (West 2007 & Supp. 2010) (feticide by vehicle); GA. CODE ANN. § 52-7-12.3 (West 2007
& Supp. 2010) (feticide by vessel); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4016 (2004) (definition of human
embryo. and fetus); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4001 (2004) (definition of murder); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 18-4006 (2004) (definition of manslaughter); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1.2 (West
2002 & Supp. 2011) (intentional homicide of an unborn child); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-
2.1 (voluntary manslaughter of an unborn child); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-3.2 (West 2002
& Supp. 2011) (involuntary manslaughter or reckless homicide of an unborn child); IND. CODE
ANN. § 35-42-1-6 (West 2011) (feticide); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5419 (West Supp. 2011); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 507A.010-.060 (West 2008) (fetal homicide); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §
14:2(A)(l l) (2007 & Supp. 2012) (defining "unborn child"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.5
(2007 & Supp. 2012) (defining "feticide"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:32.6 to .8 (2007 & Supp.
2012) (substantive offenses); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 750.90a to .90f (West 2004); MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 609.266 to .2665, 609.268 to .2691 (West 2009); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-37
(West Supp. 2011); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-388 to -394 (LexisNexis 2009); N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 12.1-17.1-01 to -04, 12.1-17.1-07, -08. (1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.01(A),
(B) (West 2010) (aggravated murder); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.02(A) (West 2010)
(murder); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.03(A) (West 2010) (voluntary manslaughter); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.04(A), (B) (West 2010) (involuntary manslaughter); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2903.041(A) (West 2010) (reckless homicide); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.05(A)
(West 2010) (negligent homicide); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.06(A) (West 2010) (aggravated
vehicular homicide, vehicular homicide, and vehicular manslaughter); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2903.09(A), (B) (West 2010) (definitions); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 691 (West Supp. 2012)
(definition of homicide); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-730(4) (West Supp. 2012) (definition of
"unborn child"); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2601 to 2605, 2607 to 2608 (West 1998); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-3-1083 (Supp. 2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-1-2(31) (Supp. 2011)
(definition of "person"); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-1-2(50A) (Supp. 2011) (definition of "unborn
child"); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-1 (Supp. 2011) (definition of homicide); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 22-16-1.1 (Supp. 2011) (fetal homicide); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-17-6 (Supp. 2011)
(intentional killing of a human fetus); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-214 (West Supp. 2012); TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(26) (West 2011) (definition of "individual"); TEX. PENAL CODE §
1.07(a)(38) (definition of "person"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-201(1)(a) (West Supp. 2010); W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-30 (West 2010); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.75(1) (West 2005 & Supp. 2011)
(definition of "unborn child"); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.01(1)(b) (West 2005 & Supp. 2011) (first
degree intentional homicide); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.02(lm) (first degree reckless homicide);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 9 40.05(2g) (second degree intentional homicide); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
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repeatedly challenged on a variety of federal (and, in a few cases,
state) constitutional grounds, no fetal homicide statute has ever been
struck down. The courts considering these challenges have uniformly
held that nothing in Roe v. Wade prevents the States from treating the
killing of an unborn child (outside the scope of abortion) as a form of
homicide; 22 that fetal homicide statutes are not unconstitutionally
vague in defining the elements of the offense in violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment;2 3 that such statutes, in
determining when life before birth shall be protected, do not
constitute an "establishment of religion" within the meaning of the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment;24 that in
distinguishing between the conduct of a pregnant woman in
consenting to an abortion and the violent acts of third parties, fetal
homicide statutes do not deny the equal protection of the law in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
940.06(2) (West 2005 & Supp. 2011) (second degree reckless homicide); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
940.08(2) (West 2005 & Supp. 2011) (homicide by negligent handling of a dangerous weapon,
explosive, or fire); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.09(1)(c), (cm), (d), (e) (homicide by intoxicated use of
a vehicle); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.09(lg)(c), (cm), (d) (West 2005 & Supp. 2011) (homicide by
intoxicated use of a firearm); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.10(2) (West 2005 & Supp. 2011) (homicide
by negligent operation of a vehicle); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 940.04(1) (West 2005 & Supp. 2011)
(intentional destruction of the life of an unborn child); see also Indiana and Michigan statutes
cited supra note 18; Wisconsin statutes cited supra note 19. In addition to the foregoing statutes,
Missouri has enacted a statute providing a rule of construction. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 1.205
(West 2000), which has been applied to the State's homicide statutes, making them applicable to
the killing of an unborn child at any stage of gestation (outside the scope of abortion). See State v.
Knapp, 843 S.W.2d 345 (Mo. 1992); State v. Holcomb, 956 S.W.2d 286 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997);
State v. Rollen, 133 S.W.3d 57 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003).
22. Davis, 872 P.2d at 597-600; Brinkley v. State, 322 S.E.2d 49, 53 (Ga. 1984); Smith v.
Newsome, 815 F.2d 1386, 1388 (11th Cir. 1987); People v. Ford, 581 N.E.2d 1189, 1199 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1991); State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318, 321-22 (Minn. 1990); State v. Rollen, 133
S.W.3d 57, 63 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003); State v. Holcomb, 956 S.W.2d 286, 291-93 (Mo. Ct. App.
1997); State v. Coleman, 705 N.E.2d 419, 420-21 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997); Coleman v. DeWitt, 282
F.3d 908, 911-13 (6th Cir. 2002); State v. Alfieri, 724 N.E.2d 477, 483 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998);
State v. Moore, No. 97 CA 137, 1998 WL 754603, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 30, 1998);
Commonwealth v. Bullock, 913 A.2d 207, 213-14 (Pa. 2006); Lawrence v. State, 240 S.W.3d
912, 917-18 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Flores v. State, 245 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Tex. Crim. App.
2008); Estrada v. State, 313 S.W.3d 274, 307-10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); see also Coe v. County.
of Cook, 162 F.2d 491, 497 (7th Cir. 1998) ("States remain free to punish feticide so long as they
don't try to punish a woman who exercised her constitutional right to abort her fetus, the physician
who performs the abortion, or the hospital or other facility, even if public, in which the abortion is
performed.").
23. Brinkley, 322 S.E.2d at 51-53; Smith, 815 F.2d at 1387-88; Ford, 581 N.E.2d at 1198-
1202; Merrill, 450 N.W.2d at 322-24; Knapp, 843 S.W.2d at 349; Alfieri, 724 N.E.2d at 482-83;
Moore, 1998 WL 754603, at *2-3; Bullock, 913 A.2d at 212-13; Lawrence, 240 S.W.3d at 915-
16; State v. MacGuire, 84 P.3d 1171, 1174-77 (Utah 2004).
24. State v. Bauer, 471 N.W.2d 363, 365-66 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991); Alfieri, 724 N.E.2d at
484; Flores, 245 S.W.3d at 438; Eguia v. State, 288 S.W.3d 1, 11-12 (Tex. App. 1st 2008).
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Amendment; 25 and that they do not constitute "cruel and unusual
punishment" in contravention of the Eighth Amendment. 26
IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY
Of the thirty-three States that have retained the death penalty
for certain criminal offenses, at least twenty-three of them, by statute,
prohibit the execution of a woman while she is pregnant.27 The
sentence of death is suspended until the woman is no longer pregnant.
PENALTY ENHANCEMENT
Of the thirty-three States that have retained the death penalty
for certain criminal offenses, at least six of them provide that the
killing of a pregnant woman is an aggravating factor that may justify
imposition of a death sentence.28
II. TORT LAW
PRENATAL INJURIES
A majority of jurisdictions (thirty) have expressly or
impliedly rejected viability as an appropriate cutoff point for
determining liability for nonfatal prenatal injuries and allow actions
to be brought for such injuries without regard to the stage of
25. Smith, 815 F.2d at 1388; People v. Campos, 592 N.E.2d 85, 97 (111. App. Ct. 1992); Ford,
581 N.E.2d at 1198-1201; Merrill, 450 N.W.2d at 321-22; Holcomb, 956 S.W.2d at 290-93;
Alfieri, 724 N.E.2d at 482; Bullock, 913 A.2d at 215-16; Flores, 245 S.W.3d at 436-37;
MacGuire, 84 P.3d at I177-78.
26. State v. Coleman, 705 N.E.2d at 421-22; DeWitt, 282 F.3d at 915; Alfieri, 724 N.E.2d at
483-84; Moore, 1998 WL 754603, at * 3-4; Eguia, 288 S.W.3d at 12-13.
27. ALA. CODE § 15-18-86 (1995); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4025, 4026 (2010); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 16-90-506(d)(2) (West 2005); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 3705-06 (2011); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 922.08 (West 2001); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-10-34, -39 (2004); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 19-
2713, -2714, -2719a (2004); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-6-10 (West 2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-
4009 (2008); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 431.240(2) (West 1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:567(D)
(2005); MD. CODE ANN., CORR. SERVS. § 3-902(e) (West 2008); MiSS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-57
(West 2006); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 546.800 to .820 (West 2002); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-19-203
to -204 (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-2540 to -2541 (West 2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 176.465 to .485 (West 2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2949.31 (West 2010); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1010-11 (West 2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(A) (2003); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 23A-27A-27 to -30 (2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-19-202 (Supp. 2010); WYo. STAT.
ANN. §§ 7-13-912 to -913 (2007).
28. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-1201(5)(q) (West 2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §
4209(e)(1)(p) (West 2007); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9(b)(16); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
9711(d)(17) (West 2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204(i)(16) (Supp. 2011); VA. CODE ANN. §
18.2-31(11) (West Supp. 2010); see also OR. REv. STAT. § 163.155 (2011) (pregnancy of victim
may be considered an aggravating factor for purposes other than imposition of the death penalty).
146 [Vol. 6:1
2011] THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE UNBORN UNDER STATE LAW
pregnancy when they were inflicted.29 A minority of jurisdictions
(seventeen States and the District of Columbia) recognize a cause of
action for prenatal injuries sustained after viability but have not yet
29. Wolfe v. Isbell, 280 So.2d 758, 761 (Ala. 1973) (express statement in context of
wrongful death action); Walker ex rel. Pizano v. Mart, 790 P.2d 735, 739 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990)
(dictum in wrongful life action); CAL. Civ. CODE § 43.1 (West 2007) ("A child conceived, but not
yet born, is deemed an existing person, so far as necessary for the child's interests in the event of
the child's subsequent birth."); Keleman v. Superior Court, 186 Cal. Rptr. 566, 568-69 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1982) (prenatal injury); Empire Cas. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine, 764 P.2d 1191, 1195-97
(Colo. 1988) (by implication in decision recognizing cause of action for pre-conception tort);
Simon v. Mullin, 380 A.2d 1353, 1357 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1977) (prenatal injury); Day v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 328 So.2d 560, 562 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (same); Larusso v.
Garner, 888 So.2d 712, 719 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (same); Hombuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line
Co., 93 S.E.2d 727 (Ga. 1956) (same); McAuley v. Wills, 303 S.E.2d 258, 259-60 (Ga. Ct. App.
1983) (dictum in wrongful death action); Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1252-
53 (Ill. 1977) (express statement in decision recognizing cause of action for pre-conception tort);
Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355, 357-58 (1Il. 1988) (following Renslow); Cowe ex rel.
Cowe v. Forum Grp., Inc., 541 N.E.2d 962, 967-68 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989), aff'd in part, rev d in
part, and remanded, 575 N.E.2d 630, 636-37 (Ind. 1991) (adopting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 869(1) (1979) (prenatal injury)); Humes v. Clinton, 792 P.2d 1032, 1037 (Kan. 1990)
(dictum in wrongful death action); Danos v. St. Pierre, 402 So.2d 633 (La. 1981) (by implication
in wrongful death action); Grp. Health Ass'n, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 453 A.2d 1198, 1206-07 (Md.
1983) (express statement in context of wrongful death action); Payton v. Abbott Labs., 437 N.E.2d
171, 182-85 (Mass. 1982) (prenatal injury); Torigian v. Watertown News Co., 225 N.E.2d 926
(Mass. 1967) (by implication in wrongful death action); Womack v. Buchhorn, 187 N.W.2d 218
(Mich. 1971) (prenatal injury); Connor v. Monkem Co., 898 S.W.2d 89 (Mo. 1995) (by
implication in wrongful death action); Bergstresser v. Mitchell, 448 F. Supp. 10, 14-15 (E.D. Mo.
1977), affd, 577 F.2d 22, 25-26 (8th Cir. 1978) (recognizing by implication cause of action for
pre-conception tort); Miller v. Duhart, 637 S.W.2d 183, 185 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (dictum in
wrongful life case); Weaks v. Mounter, 493 P.2d 1307, 1309 (Nev. 1972) (prenatal injury); White
v. Yup, 458 P.2d 617, 620-21 (Nev. 1969) (express statement in context of wrongful death
action); Bennett v. Hymers, 147 A.2d 108 (N.H. 1958) (prenatal injury); Smith v. Brennan, 157
A.2d 497, 498-505 (N.J. 1960) (same); Hughson v. St. Francis Hosp., 459 N.Y.S.2d 814, 815
(N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (same); Kelly v. Gregory, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696, 698 (N.Y. App. Div. 1953)
(same); Stetson v. Easterling, 161 S.E.2d 531, 533-34 (N.C. 1968) (express statement in context
of wrongful death action); Gay v. Thompson, 146 S.E.2d 425, 429 (N.C. 1966) (by implication in
wrongful death action); Hopkins v. McBane 359 N.W.2d 862, 864 (N.D. 1985) (adopting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 869(1) (1979) in context of wrongful death
action); Evans v. Olson, 550 P.2d 924, 927 (Okla. 1976) (express statement in context of wrongful
death action); Sinkler v. Kneale, 164 A.2d 93 (Pa. 1960) (prenatal injury); Sylvia v. Gobeille, 220
A.2d 222 (R.I. 1966) (same); Wiersma v. Maple Leaf Farms, 543 N.W.2d 787 (S.D. 1996) (by
implication in wrongful death action); Delgado v. Yandell, 468 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. Ct. App. 1971),
writ refused n.r.e. per curiam, 471 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. 1971) (prenatal injury); Kalafut v. Gruver,
389 S.E.2d 681, 683-84 (Va. 1990) (adopting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 869(1)
(1979) in context of wrongful death action); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 495
(Wash. 1983) (dictum in wrongful life case); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Rankin, 367 P.2d 835,
837-38 (Wash. 1962) (prenatal injury); Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522, 532 (W. Va. 1995)
(express statement in context of wrongful death action); Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins.
Co., 148 N.W.2d 107, 109 (Wis. 1967) (express statement in context of wrongful death action);
Puhl v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 99 N.W.2d 163, 169-71 (Wis. 1959) (dictum in prenatal injury
case), overruled on other grounds by In re Estate of Stromsted, 299 N.W.2d 226, 229-30 (Wis.
1980). See generally Roland F. Chase, Annotation, Liability for Prenatal Injuries, 40 A.L.R.3d
1222 (1971 & Supp. 2011) (collecting cases).
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decided whether the action will lie for injuries suffered before
viability.30 There are no reported cases recognizing or denying a
cause of action for prenatal injuries from Alaska, Maine, and
Wyoming. No state court has rejected a cause of action for prenatal
injuries since 1969.31
WRONGFUL DEATH
The overwhelming majority of jurisdictions (forty States and
the District of Columbia) now allow recovery under wrongful death
statutes for prenatal injuries resulting in stillbirth where the injury
causing death (or the death itself) occurs after viability.32 Two of
30. Crussell v. Electrolux Home Prods., Inc., 499 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1138-41 (W.D. Ark.
2007) (applying Arkansas law); Luff v. Hawkins, 551 A.2d 437, 438 n.l (Del. Super. Ct. 1988)
(by implication in wrongful death action); Worgan v. Greggo & Ferrara, Inc., 128 A.2d 557 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1956) (express statement in context of wrongful death action); Wade v. United States,
745 F. Supp. 1573, 1579 (D. Haw. 1990) (same); Volk v. Baldazo, 651 P.2d II, 13 (Idaho 1982)
(same); Lambert v. Sisters of Mercy Health Corp., 369 N.W.2d 417 (Iowa 1985) (recognizing
action for medical malpractice in attending pregnant woman); Kilker ex rel. Kilker v. Mulry, 437
N.W.2d I (Iowa Ct. App. 1988) (prenatal injury); Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1955)
(by implication in wrongful death action); City of Louisville v. Stuckenburg, 438 S.W.2d 94, 95
(Ky. 1968) (same); Verkennes v. Comica, 38 N.W.2d 838 (Minn. 1949) (same); Pehrson v.
Kistner, 222 N.W.2d 334, 336 (Minn. 1974) (following Verkennes); Rainey v. Horn, 72 So.2d
434, 439-40 (Miss. 1954) (express statement in context of wrongful death action); Strzelczyk v.
Jett, 870 P.2d 730 (Mont. 1994) (by implication in wrongful death action); Hartley v. Guthmann,
532 N.W.2d 331 (Neb. 1995) (prenatal injury); Miles v. Box Butte County, 489 N.W.2d 829 (Neb.
1992) (same); Davila v. Bodelson, 704 P.2d 1119 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985) (same); Williams v.
Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 87 N.E.2d 334 (Ohio 1949) (same); Griffiths v. Doctors Hosp., 780
N.E.2d 603, 606 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002) (dictum in wrongful death case); Mallison v. Pomeroy, 291
P.2d 225 (Or. 1955) (by implication in wrongful death case); Hall v. Murphy, 113 S.E.2d 790, 793
(S.C. 1960) (express statement in context of wrongful death action); Shousha v. Matthews
Drivurself Serv., Inc., 358 S.W.2d 471, 476 (Tenn. 1962) (same); Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93
(Utah 1982) (apparently recognizing that a cause of action for prenatal injuries exists in Utah);
Vaillancourt v. Med. Ctr. Hosp. of Vt., Inc., 425 A.2d 92, 94-95 (Vt. 1980) (by implication in
wrongful death action); Greater Se. Cmty. Hosp. v. Williams, 482 A.2d 394, 396 & n.2 (D.C.
1984) (express statement in context of wrongful death action).
31. See Lawrence v. Craven Tire Co., 169 S.E.2d 440 (Va. 1969); Marlow v. Krapek, 174
N.W.2d 172 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969).
32. In addition to the cases cited supra notes 29-30 from courts in Delaware, Idaho,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia, the following States allow
wrongful death actions for viable unborn children. Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 300 So.2d 354
(Ala. 1974); Summerfield v. Superior Court, 698 P.2d 712, 719-24 (Ariz. 1985); Aka v. Jefferson
Hosp. Ass'n, Inc., 42 S.W.3d 508, 515-19 (Ark. 2001); Espadero v. Feld, 649 F. Supp. 1480,
1483-85 (D. Colo. 1986), cited with approval in Keefe v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 868 P.2d 1092,
1094 (Colo. App. 1994); Gorke v. LeClerc, 181 A.2d 448 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1962); Florence v.
Town of Plainfield, 849 A.2d 7, 15-19 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2004); Porter v. Lassiter, 87 S.E.2d 100
(Ga. Ct. App. 1955); Shirley v. Bacon, 267 S.E.2d 809 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980); Wade v. United
States, 745 F. Supp. 1573, 1575-79 (D. Haw. 1990); Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 304 N.E.2d
88 (Ill. 1973); Hale v. Manion, 368 P.2d I (Kan. 1962); State ex rel. Odham v. Sherman, 198 A.2d
71 (Md. 1964); Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 331 N.E.2d 916 (Mass. 1975); O'Neill v. Morse,
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these States also allow recovery where the death (or injury causing
death) occurs after quickening, 33 and eleven States allow recovery
regardless of the stage of pregnancy when the injury and death
occur.34 And where prenatal injuries result in death after live birth,
the weight of modem authority rejects any requirement of viability as
a condition of recovery under wrongful death statutes. 3 5
188 N.W.2d 785 (Mich. 1971); Jarvis v. Providence Hosp., 444 N.W.2d 236, 238-39 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1989); O'Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904 (Mo. 1983); Poliquin v. MacDonald, 135 A.2d
249 (N.H. 1957); Salazar v. St. Vincent Hosp., 619 P.2d 826 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980); DiDonato v.
Wortman, 358 S.E.2d 489, 490-93 (N.C. 1987); Werling v. Sandy, 476 N.E.2d 1053 (Ohio 1985);
Libbee v. Permanente Clinic, 518 P.2d 636, 637-40 (Or. 1974); Amadio v. Levin, 501 A.2d 1085
(Pa. 1985); Presley v. Newport Hosp., 365 A.2d 748 (R.I. 1976); Fowler v. Woodward, 138
S.E.2d 42 (S.C. 1964); Farley v. Mount Mary Hosp. Ass'n, 387 N.W.2d 42 (S.D. 1986); Carranza
v. United States, 267 P.3d 912 (Utah 2011) (interpreting former UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-6
(West Supp. 2006)); Moen v. Hanson, 537 P.2d 266 (Wash. 1975); see also ARK. CODE ANN. §
16-62-102(a)(1) (West 2005) (recognizing cause of action for the wrongful death of a viable
unborn child); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-809(1) (West 2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-5-106(c)
(West 2009); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.001(4) (West 2008). See generally
Sheldon R. Shapiro, Annotation, Right to Maintain Action or to Recover Damages for Death of
Unborn Child, 84 A.L.R.3d 411 (1978 & Supp. 2011) (collecting cases).
33. Porter, 87 S.E.2d at 100; Rainey, 72 So.2d at 434; MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-13 (West
2004) (amending wrongful death statute to include an "unborn quick child").
34. Mack v. Carmack, 79 So.3d 597 (Ala. 2012); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 18012.2 (West
2010) (amending wrongful death statute .to apply to an unborn child regardless of the stage of
gestation or development). But see Miller v. Infertility Grp. of Ill., Inc., 897 N.E.2d 837 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2008) (statute does not apply to pre-implanted fertilized ova); Danos, 402 So.2d at 638-39
(rejecting viability requirement) (codified at LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 26 (1999) ("An unborn
child shall be considered as a natural person for whatever relates to its interests from the moment
of conception. If the child is born dead, it shall be considered never to have existed as a person,
except for purposes of actions resulting from its wrongful death.")); Wartelle v. Women's and
Children's Hosp., Inc., 704 So.2d 778, 781 (La. 1998) (citing LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 26);
Conner, 898 S.W.2d at 89 (interpreting statute setting forth rule of construction); Wiersma v.
Maple Leaf Farms, 543 N.W.2d 787 (S.D. 1996) (interpreting wrongful death statute); Carranza,
267 P.3d at 913-15; Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 522 (interpreting wrongful death statute); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 600.2922a (West 2010); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-809(1) (West 2010)
(amending wrongful death statute to include "an unborn child in utero at any stage of gestation");
OKLA STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1053(F) (West Supp. 2012); OKLA STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-730; S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 21-5-1 (1987) (amending wrongful death statute to include "an unborn child");
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.001(4) (West 2008) (defining "individual" in wrongful
death statute to include "an unborn child at every stage of gestation from fertilization until birth").
35. See, e.g., Simon v. Mullin, 380 A.2d 1353 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1977); Humes v. Clinton,
792 P.2d 1032, 1036 (Kan. 1990) (dictum); Kandel v. White, 663 A.2d 1264, 1266 (Md. 1995)
(summarizing Maryland law); Grp. Health Ass'n v. Blumenthal, 453 A.2d 1198 (Md. 1983);
Thibert v. Milka, 646 N.E.2d 1025, 1026 (Mass. 1995) (summarizing Massachusetts law);
Torigian v. Watertown News Co., 225 N.E.2d 926 (Mass. 1967); McKinstry v. Valley Obstetrics-
Gynecology Clinic, P.C., 405 N.W.2d 88, 99 (Mich. 1987); Wallace v. Wallace, 421 A.2d 134
(N.H. 1980); Hudak v. Georgy, 634 A.2d 600 (Pa. 1993); Miccolis v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 587
A.2d 67 (R.I. 1991) (by implication); Kalafut v. Gruver, 389 S.E.2d 681 (Va. 1990). But see
Ferguson v. District of Columbia, 629 A.2d 15 (D.C. 1993) (no cause of action for the wrongful
death of an unborn child, even one born alive, unless child had reached viability at the time injury
was inflicted or by the time death occurred); Baxter v. AHS Samaritan Hosp, LLC, 328 S.W.3d
687, 692-93 (Ky. Ct. App. 2010) (same); Miller v. Kirk, 905 P.2d 194 (N.M. 1995) (same).
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Fourteen of the forty jurisdictions that have allowed a cause
of action for the wrongful death of unborn child after viability,
however, have denied recovery (for stillbirth) where both the injury
and the death occur before viability.36 A minority of States (eight)
still deny wrongful death actions for prenatal injuries unless the death
follows a live birth. And two States have not yet decided whether a
wrongful death action will lie for prenatal injuries resulting in
stillbirth.38
WRONGFUL LIFE AND WRONGFUL BIRTH CAUSES OF ACTION
A "wrongful life" cause of action is a claim brought on behalf
of a child who is born with a physical or mental disability or disease
that could have been discovered before the child's birth (or, in some
cases, before the child was conceived) by genetic testing,
amniocentesis, or other medical screening. The gravamen of the
action is that, as a result of a physician's failure to inform the child's
parents of the child's disability or disease (or at least of the
availability of tests to determine the presence of the disability or
disease) or of the possibility that any child they would conceive
might suffer from such a condition, they were deprived of the
opportunity to abort the child (or of preventing the child's conception
in the first place), thus resulting in the conception and birth of a child
experiencing permanent physical or mental impairment. A "wrongful
birth" cause of action, on the other hand, is a claim based on the same
36. Jeter v. Mayo Clinic Ariz., 121 P.3d 1256, 1261-71 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005)
(cryopreserved, three-day-old eight-cell pre-embryo was not a "person" for purposes of recovery
under Arizona's wrongful death statute which, as interpreted, allows recovery only for viable
stillborn children); Santana v. Zilog, Inc., 95 F.3d 780 (9th Cir. 1996) (applying Idaho law);
Humes, 792 P.2d 1032; Baxter, 328 S.W.3d at 692-93; Kandel, 663 A.2d 1264; Thibert, 646
N.E.2d 1025; Blackburn v. Blue Mountain Women's Clinic, 951 P.2d 1, 16 (Mont. 1997);
Wallace, 421 A.2d at 134; Miller, 905 P.2d at 196-97; LaDu v. Or. Clinic, P.C., 998 P.2d 733 (Or.
Ct. App. 2000); Coveleski v. Bubnis, 634 A.2d 608 (Pa. 1993); Miccolis, 587 A.2d 67; Crosby v.
Glasscock Trucking Co., 532 S.E.2d 856 (S.C. 2000); Baum v. Burrington, 79 P.3d 456 (Wash.
Ct. App. 2003).
37. Justus v. Atchison, 565 P.2d 122, 124-34 (Cal. 1977); Hernandez v. Garwood, 390 So.2d
357 (Fla. 1980); Stern v. Miller, 348 So.2d 303 (Fla. 1977); Bolin v. Wingert, 764 N.E.2d 201,
203-07 (Ind. 2002); Dunn v. Rose Way, Inc., 333 N.W.2d 830, 831 (Iowa 1983); McKillip v.
Zimmerman, 191 N.W.2d 706 (Iowa 1971); Weitl v. Moes, 311 N.W.2d 259, 270-73 (Iowa
1981); Milton v. Cary Med. Ctr., 538 A.2d 252 (Me. 1988); Shaw v. Jendzejec, 717 A.2d 367,
370-72 (Me. 1998) (adhering to Milton on stare decisis grounds only); Graf v. Taggart, 204 A.2d
140 (N.J. 1964); Endresz v. Friedberg, 248 N.E.2d 901, 902-05 (N.Y. 1969); Broadnax v.
Gonzalez, 809 N.E.2d 645, 648 (N.Y. 2004) (dictum); Lawrence v. Craven Tire Co., 169 S.E.2d
440 (Va. 1969).
38. Alaska and Wyoming. But see Mace v. Jung, 210 F. Supp. 706 (D. Alaska 1962)
(denying cause of action for nonviable unborn child).
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facts brought by the parents of the impaired child on their own
behalf. Although most state courts that have considered the issue
recognize wrongful birth actions, the overwhelming majority of such
courts refuse to recognize wrongful life actions because of the
impossibility of determining damages based upon a comparison
between life in the child's impaired condition and non-existence and
because of the strong public policy protecting and preserving human
life.39 In addition, ten States, by statute, have banned both wrongful
life and wrongful birth causes of action.40 Constitutional challenges
brought against these statutes, including the argument that they
interfere with the "abortion liberty" recognized in Roe v. Wade, have
been rejected.41
39. Elliott v. Brown, 361 So.2d 546, 548 (Ala. 1978); Walker ex rel. Pizano v. Mart, 790
P.2d 735 (Ariz. 1990); Linninger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202, 1209-12 (Colo. 1988); Rich v.
Foye, 976 A.2d 819, 834-38 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007); Garrison v. Med. Ctr. of Del., Inc., 581
A.2d 288, 293-94 (Del. 1990); Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So.2d 415, 423 (Fla. 1992); Spires v. Kim, 416
S.E.2d 780 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (interpreting Atlanta Obstetrics & Gynecology Grp. v. Abelson,
398 S.E.2d 557 (Ga. 1990) to bar such actions); Blake v. Cruz, 698 P.2d 315, 321-22 (Idaho
1984); Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 512 N.E.2d 691, 696-703 (111. 1987); Bruggemann ex
rel. Bruggemann v. Schinke, 718 P.2d 635 (Kan. 1986); Grubbs v. Barbourville Family Health
Ctr., P.S.C., 120 S.W.3d 682 (Ky. 2003); Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 517 So.2d 1019, 1024-
25 (La. Ct. App. 1987), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, and remanded, 530 So.2d
1151 (La. 1988); Latullas v. State, 658 So.2d 800, 806 & n.7 (La. Ct. App. 1995); Kassama v.
Magat, 792 A.2d 1102, 1114-24 (Md. 2002); Viccaro v. Milunsky, 551 N.E.2d 8, 12-13 (Mass.
1990); Taylor v. Kurapati, 600 N.W.2d 670, 682-94 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999); Proffit v. Bartolo, 412
N.W.2d 232, 238-43 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987); Strohmaier v. Assocs. in Obstetrics & Gynecology,
332 N.W.2d 432 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982); Dorlin v. Providence Hosp., 325 N.W.2d 600, 602 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1982); Eisbrenner v. Stanley, 308 N.W.2d 209, 211-13 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981); Greco v.
United States, 893 P.2d 345, 347-48 (Nev. 1995); Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 351-55 (N.H.
1986); Sheppard-Mobley ex rel. Mobley v. King, 830 N.E.2d 301, 305 (N.Y. 2005) (citing Becker
v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 808-14 (N.Y. 1978); Alquijay v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr.,
473 N.E.2d 244 (N.Y. 1984)); Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528, 532-33 (N.C. 1985);
Willis v. Wu, 607 S.E.2d 63, 71 (S.C. 2004); Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 924-25 (Tex.
1984); James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872, 878-81 (W. Va. 1985); Dumer v. St. Michael's
Hosp., 233 N.W.2d 372, 374-76 (Wis. 1975); Beardsley v. Wierdsma, 650 P.2d 288, 289-90
(Wyo. 1982). But see Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982) (recognizing action); Procanik v.
Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 760-63 (N.J. 1984) (same); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483,
494-97 (Wash. 1983) (same).
40. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-334 (West 2010); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-12-1-1 (West 2011);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.424 (West 2011); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.130 (West 2011); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 32-03-43 (2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.11.6 (West 2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
63, § 1-741.12 (West Supp. 2012); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8305(a) (West 2007); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 21-55-1 to -4 (2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-109(2) (West 2008). At least
four States, in the absence of legislation, have refused to recognize wrongful birth, as well as
wrongful life, causes of action. See Atlanta Obstetrics & Gynecology Grp., 398 S.E.2d at 558-63;
Grubbs, 120 S.W.3d at 687-91; Taylor, 600 N.W.2d at 685-92 (overruling contrary holdings);
Azzolino, 337 S.E.2d at 533-37.
41. See Hickman v. Grp. Health Plan, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 10 (Minn. 1986); Dansby v. Thomas
Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 623 A.2d 816, 819-21 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); Wood v. Univ. of Utah Med.
Ctr., 67 P.3d 436, 440-49 (Utah 2003); see also Spires, 416 S.E.2d at 782-83 (nothing in Roe
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III. HEALTH CARE LAW
All of the States have enacted statutes authorizing competent
adults to execute advance directives (living wills and durable powers
of attorney for health care) setting forth what health care they wish to
receive in the event that they are no longer able to make those
decisions for themselves. Subject to limited exceptions, most of these
statutes prohibit the withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining
treatment from a pregnant woman patient under the authority of an
advance directive. 42 Similarly, these statutes prohibit an agent acting
under a health care power of attorney from authorizing an abortion. 43
requires the State to recognize a cause of action for wrongful life); Taylor, 600 N.W.2d at 687
(explaining that the State "has no obligation [under Roe v. Wade] to take the affirmative step of
imposing civil liability on a party for failing to provide a pregnant woman with information that
would make her more likely to have an elective, and eugenic, abortion").
42. ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4(h) (2006) ("Advance Directive for Health Care," § 3); ALASKA
STAT. § 13.52.055 (2008); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-206(c) (West 2005); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 19a-574 (West 2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2503(j) (West 2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
765.113(2) (West 2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-4 (2009) (Form, Part Two, 1 (9)); GA. CODE
ANN. § 31-32-9(1); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-4504 (West 2002) (A Living Will, 4); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 39-4505 (2002) (A Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care, 1 4); 755 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 35/3(c) (West Supp. 2011); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-36-4-8(d) (West 2007); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 144A.6(2) (West 2005); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28,103(a) (West 2008) (last
sentence); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 311.625(1) (form), 311.629(4) (West 2007 & Supp. 2010);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 700.5509(1)(d), 700.5512(1) (West Supp. 2011); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
459.025 (West 2007); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-106(7), 50-9-202(3) (2011); NEB. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 20-408(3) (West 2008); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-3417(1)(b) (West 2010); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 449.624(4) (West 2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-J:5(V)(c) (Supp. 2011); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 23-06.5-09(5) (Supp. 2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1337.13(D), 2133.06(B)
(West 2007); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3101.4(C) (West Supp. 2012) (Advance Directive for
Health Care Form, [V(c)); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3101.8(C); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
5429(a), (b) (West Supp. 2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-4.10-5(c), 23-4.11-6(c) (2008); S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 44-77-70, 62-5-504(G) (2002 & Supp. 2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 34-12D-10, 59-7-
2.8 (2009); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.049 (West 2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-
2a-123(1) (West Supp. 2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.030(1)(d) (West 2011); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 154.03 (West 2006) (Directive to Attending Physician, 4); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
154.19(1)(e) (DNR orders); see also 20 PA. CONS. Stat. Ann. § 5429(b) (DNR orders); TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.098 (same).
43. ALA. CODE § 26-1-2(g)(1) (Supp. 2011); ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.150(e)(2) (2008)
(restriction on guardian authorizing an abortion); CAL. PROB. CODE § 4652(e) (West 2009); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 765.113(l) (West 2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-14(b) (2009); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN § 162A.850(1)(e) (West 2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06-5.03(6) (Supp. 2009); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 3-119(3) (West 2009) (restriction on guardian authorizing an abortion); OR.
REV. STAT. § 127.540(5) (2009); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 166.152(f)(4) (West 2010);
VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2983.3(B) (West Supp. 2010); see also TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
166.163 (form of disclosure statement).
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IV. PROPERTY LAW
The rights of unborn children are also protected by property
law. A posthumous child-a child conceived before the death of a
parent (and, in some States, certain other close relatives) who dies
intestate (without a will) but born thereafter-inherits as if he or she
had been born during the lifetime of the decedent." And, subject to
certain exceptions, if a person fails to provide in his or her will for a
child born after the will is executed, the omitted child receives a
share in the estate equal in value to what he or she would have
received if the testator had died intestate or a share that is equal to
that given to children named in the will. 45 A similar rule applies to
44. ALA. CODE § 43-8-47 (1991); ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.108 (2008); ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14-2108 (2005); ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-210 (2004); CAL. PROB. CODE § 6407 (West
2009); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-1 1-104(1)(b) (West 2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 505
(West 2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.106 (West 2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-2-1(b)(1) (West
Supp. 2010); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. 560:2-108 (LexisNexis 2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-
108 (2009); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-3 (West 2007); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-6 (West
2010); IOWA CODE ANN. § 63 3.220 (West 1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-501(a) (2008); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 391.070, 394.460 (West 2010); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 940 (2000); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2-108 (1998); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3-107 (West 2001); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 190, § 8 (West Supp. 2011); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2108 (West
2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-108 (West 2002); Harper v. Archer, 12 Miss. (4 S & M.) 99,
109 (Miss. 1845) (finding that an infant is in existence from the time of conception for the purpose
of taking any estate which is for his benefit, provided that the infant is born alive and after such a
period of fetal existence that its continuation in life might be reasonably expected); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 474.050 (West 2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-118 (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN.§
30-2308 (West 2010); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 111.085 (West 2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
21.20 (2008) (definition of issue); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 561:1 (2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
3B:5-8 (West 2007); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-104(A)(2) (2011); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS
LAW § 4-1.1(c) (McKinney 1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-9 (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-
04 (2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.14 (West 2007); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 228 (West
1990); OR. REV. STAT. § 112.075 (2007); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2104(4) (West 2005); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 62-2-108 (Supp. 2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-108 (2004); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 31-2-108 (2007); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-104(1)(b) (Supp. 2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
14, § 303 (2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-8.1 (West 2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
11.02.005(8) (West Supp. 2012); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-8 (West 2004); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
854.21(5) (West Supp. 2011); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 2-4-103 (2009).
45. ALA. CODE § 43-8-91 (1991); ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.302 (2008); ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14-2302 (2005); ARK CODE ANN. § 28-39-407 (2004); CAL. PROB. CODE § 21620 (West
2011); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-302 (West 2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-256b
(West 2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 301, 310 (2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.302 (West
2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-4-48 (West Supp. 2010); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:2-302
(LexisNexis 2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-2-302 (2009); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4-10
(West 2007); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-3-8 (West 2010); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.267 (West 1992);
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 394.382 (West 2010); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1474 (2000); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2-302 (1998); MD. CODE ANN., EST & TRUSTS, § 3-301 to -303 (West
2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 191, § 20 (West Supp. 2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
700.2302 (West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-302 (West Supp. 2012); MISS. CODE ANN. §§
153
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V. GUARDIANSHIP LAW
Finally, all States-by statute, court rule or case law-permit
a guardian ad litem to be appointed to represent the interests of an
unborn child in various matters including estates and trusts.47
91-5-3, -5 (West 1999); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 474.240 (West 2009): MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-332
(2011); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-2321 (LexisNexis 2010); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 133.160,
133.180 (West 2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 551:10 (2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:5-16 (West
2007); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-302 (2008); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-32
(McKinney Supp. 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-5.5 (2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-5 (2009)
(finding an unborn child "shall be deemed a person capable of taking by deed or other writing any
estate whatever in the same manner as if he were born"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-06-02 (2010);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.34 (West 2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 131 (West 1990);
OR. REV. STAT. § 112.405 (2007); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2514(4) (West 2005); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 33-6-23, -24, 33-6-27 (2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-302 (2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §
29A-2-302 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-3-103 (2007); TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 67 (West
Supp. 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-302 (West Supp. 2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 303,
332-34 (2010); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64.1-70 to -71 (West 2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
11.12.091 (West 1998); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 41-4-1 to -2 (West 2004); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
854.21(5) (West Supp. 2011).
46. ALA. CODE § 35-4-8 (1991); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 698, 739 (West 2007); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 38-30-119 (West 2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.140 (West 1999); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 500.14 (West Supp. 2012); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 111.080 (West 2010); N.M.
STAT ANN. § 47-1-21 (1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-02-19 (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2307.12.1 (West 2010) (finding the court may appoint a trustee to represent the future interests of
an unborn child); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1147.1 (West 2000) (same); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §
43-3-14 (2004); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.036 (West 2007); see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-
02-29 (1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-3-16 (2004)).
47. ALA. CODE §.19-3B-305 (2007); ALASKA STAT. § 13.06.120(4) (2008); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14-1408 (Supp. 2011); ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-305(a) (West Supp. 2009); CAL.
CIV. CODE § 373.5 (West 2004); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-10-403(5) (West 2011); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-132 (West 2010); DEL. CH. Ct. R.17(c); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 731.303(4)
(West 2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-1 1-2(b) (Supp. 2010); HAW. PROB. R. 28(b); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 15-1-403(d) (2009); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-501 (West 2003); IND. CODE ANN. §
29-1-1-20(b) (West 2010); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633A.6306 (West Supp. 2011); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 59-2205 (2008); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 389A.035 (West 2010); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 252
(2008) (authorizing appointment of a "curator" to represent the interests of an unborn person);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-B, § 305 (Supp. 2011) (authorizing appointment of a
"representative" to represent the interests of an unborn person in a matter concerning a trust);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 206, § 24 (West Supp. 2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2045
(West 1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 501B.19 (West Supp. 2012); MISS. CIV. P. R. 17(c); MO. ANN.
STAT. § 472.300(4) (West 2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-35-313(1) (2011); NEB. REV. STAT.
ANN.§ 30-2222(4) (LexisNexis 2010); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 155.140(1)(h) (West 2009); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 498-A:23 (2009) (eminent domain proceedings); N.J. R. CT. 4:26-3(a); N.M.
STAT. § 45-1-403(D) (Supp. 2011); N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT LAW § 315 (McKinney 1994);
N.C. R. CIV. P. 17(b)(4); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-03-03(5) (2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
5803.05 (West 2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1147.3 (West 2010); OR. REV. STAT. §
130.120 (2009); PA. ORPHANS' CT. R. 12.4(a); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-1-403(4) (Supp. 2011); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 55-3-32(3) (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-15-305(a) (year); TEX. PROP. CODE
§ 115.014(a) (West Supp. 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-305 (Supp. 2010); VT. PROB. R. 18(c);
VA. CODE ANN. § 55-542.06(A)(4) (West 2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.96A.160 (West
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CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v.
Wade, the States remain free to extend the protection of the law to
unborn children so long as that protection does not interfere with the
"abortion liberty" recognized in Roe. And, as the foregoing survey
indicates, all of the States have chosen to do so in one or (more
commonly) multiple areas of the law-criminal law, tort law, health
care law, property law and guardianship law. The legal protections
States have accorded unborn children outside the scope of abortion
have withstood repeated constitutional challenges.48 It is surely an
anomaly that, in every area of law but one-abortion-the States
may define the legal status of the unborn child and confer legal rights
upon the unborn child. But that anomaly is one that is entirely of the
Supreme Court's making and one which, at some point, the Court
will need to confront and resolve.
2006); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 44D-3-305 (West 2004); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.235(1)(f) (West
2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-305(a) (2009) (authorizing appointment of a representative to
represent the interests of an unborn person in matters concerning a trust); see Spencer v.
McMullen, 81 A.2d 237 (Md. 1951) (authorizing appointment of a guardian adlitem to represent
the interests of an unborn child).
48. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 22-26, 41.
155
